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State Taxation of Military Housing: A
Possessory Interesting Question
The whole of this subject of taxation is full of diculties.1
Since M'Culloch v. -Maryland2 in 1819, states have sought ways
around -the general federal governmental immunity from state taxa-
tion3 inherent in the Supremacy Clause4 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The broad basic doctrine of constitutional prohibition of state
taxation of the possessions, institutions, or activities of the federal gov-
ernment' is still upheld in contemporary cases.6 Only an express
waiver by the United States can remove this immunity from state taxa-
tion.7
Most states continue to be confronted with the modem reality of
financial pressures and the concomitant demand of constantly ex-
panding bases of revenue. Although states still cannot tax federally
owned land8 or the improvements upon it, many states, including Cali-
fornia, have devised ways to avoid this limitation. By developing and
imposing a concept of assessments of interests less than a fee interest,
California and 21 other states realize some revenue from lands owned
by tax-exempt entities.9 These so-called "possessory interests" typically
arise when an individual or corporate private party leases land or im-
provements from a public owner, generally the federal government.' 0
1. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 376 (1819) (statement of Mr. Martin, the
Attorney General of Maryland).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. See id. at 361-66.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. VI provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
5. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 361-66.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975); First Agricul-
tural Nat'1 Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. County of Los Angeles, 588 F.2d 1308 (9th
Cir. 1979).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938); Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 297 U.S. 209 (1936); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. Besides California, these states are: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Ca-
nada also follows similar procedures for taxation of possessory interests in tax-exempt property.
See generally 55 A.L.R.3d 430.
10. See generally Comment, The California Possessory Interest Tax: A Time Honored Concept
Gets a New Twist, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 827 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Possessory Interest
Tax).
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Since the interest taxed is that of use or possession when it is unaccom-
panied by ownership in the land or improvements, taxation of posses-
sory interests is not inconsistent with the doctrine of federal immunity
from state taxation.t I
The power to tax possessory interests in government lands is a partic-
ularly important one in California. The state presently receives only
half of its revenue from property tax. 12 Fully one-half of California's
one hundred million acres lies in the public domain. t3 Tax immunity
for these lands stems from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution as well as from the act that admitted California to the
union. 4 The pecuniary impact of this immunity is enormous. Receipt
of some revenue from public lands would seem crucial to the fiscal sta-
bility of California, particularly in light of the financial insecurity gen-
erated by Proposition 13 and other recent taxpayer initiatives and
legislative taxation relief measures. 5
Section 10716 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code codifies
the concept of taxation of possessory interests in California. Possessory
interest is defined as "possession of, claim to, or right to the possession
of land or improvements, except when coupled with ownership of the
land or improvements in the same person."' 7 "Taxable improvements
on tax-exempt land"18 are specifically included.
Despite the clear language of Section 107, two recent cases have
yielded seemingly conflicting interpretations. Tax officials seeking to
assess taxes on possessory interests in federal government housing pres-
ently are confronted with conflicting precedents regarding their author-
ity to do so. In United States v. Count)y of Fresno,t9 the United States
Supreme Court found constitutional the taxation of the possessory in-
terests of forest rangers living in quarters provided by their employer,
the United States Forest Service.20 But when tax assessors in Hum-
boldt and Yuba Counties later levied assessments against United States
11. See Possessory Interest Tax, supra note 10, at 827.
12. See K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY §1, at 4 (1967) and §1.3,
at 6-7 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as EHRMAN & FLAVIN].
13. See EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, §3 at 5 (1967) and §1.3 at 6-7 (2d ed. 1979).
14. California was admitted to the Union September 9, 1850. An Act for the Admission of
the State of California into the Union, c. 50, 9 STATS. 452 (1850). The act provides that the state
"shall never levy any tax or assessment of any description whatsoever upon the public domain of
the United States." Id. at 453. See, e.g., Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 262 P. 314 (1927);
People v. Donnelly, 58 Cal. 144 (1881); Central Pac. R. Co. v. Howard, 52 Cal. 227 (1877).
15. For a discussion of Proposition 13 and its impact on California tax law, see generally
EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, at §2.1-2.32 (2d ed. 1979).
16. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §107(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. §107(b).
19. 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
20. See id. at 464-67.
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Navy and Air Force personnel residing in quarters furnished by their
employer, also the federal government, the tax was invalidated. In
United States v. County of Humboldt, California,21 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's findings that such a tax not
only failed to qualify as a possessory interest tax, but that its imposition
on military personnel violated the Supremacy Clause.22
Future official actions regarding taxation of possessory interests now
depend upon resolution of these conflicting decisions. Assessors must
know whether they may validly tax possessory interests in residences
provided by the federal government to the thousands of military per-
sonnel and federal employees living in government quarters located on
or near tax-exempt lands in California.23 Resolution of the conflict is
essential to an orderly administration of tax procedures so that ade-
quate revenue can be obtained fairly and efficiently. Such a resolution
first requires clarification of two central issues: does occupancy of gov-
ernment quarters on or near military installations constitute a posses-
sory interest by service members living in these quarters, and, if so,
does such an interest fall within the meaning of Section 107? If these
two questions are answered in the affirmative then a further issue must
be addressed, that of whether possessory use taxes can be imposed
upon these interests in a manner that does not violate the Supremacy
Clause or infringe constitutional immunities.
Through a brief examination of the development of the intergovern-
mental immunity doctrine as well as the concept of possessory interest
and an analysis of recent case law, this comment will demonstrate that
residence in government quarters by federal and military employees
constitutes a valid possessory interest as authorized by California law.
The comment also will show that taxation of this legitimate revenue
base can be assessed without violating the United States Constitution. 4
21. 628 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1980).
22. See id. at 552-53.
23. Statistics for United States Air Force personnel alone indicate the numbers of potential
taxpayers in this category. The ten major Air Force installations in California and their resident
populations include: Beale Air Force Base, 13 miles E. of Marysville, 1737 family residences;
Castle Air Force Base, 8 miles Nw. of Merced, 934; Edwards Air Force Base, 20 miles E. of
Rosamond, 4038; George Air Force Base, 6 miles Nw. of Victorville, 1441; March Air Force Base,
9 miles Se. of Riverside, 711; Mather Air Force Base, 12 mi. E.Se. of Sacramento, 1272; McClellan
Air Force Base, 9 miles Ne. of Sacramento, 675; Norton Air Force Base, 59 miles E. of Los Ange-
les, 264; Travis Air Force Base, 50 miles Ne. of San Francisco, 2167; Vandenberg Air Force Base,
81 miles N.Nw. of Lompoc, 2183. The Air Force thus provides housing for 15,462 families. See
AIR FORCE MAGAZINE ALMANAC, May, 1981, at 176-82. Families residing in quarters provided
by the United States Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard are similarly situated.
24. This discussion will be limited to the possessory interest and constitutional issues relating
to military personnel occupying family residences that are provided and owned by the federal
government and located in California. California does not recognize possessory interest taxation
of personal property. See EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, §55 at 64 (1967). Possessory interest
taxation of intangible property will be discussed historically and a discussion of the administrative
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This comment will begin with a brief review of the concepts of posses-
sory interest and federal governmental immunity from state taxation to
lend perspective to the issues to be discussed later.
THE GENESIS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A. The Eary Doctrine
In 1819 the United States Supreme Court established the immunity
from state taxation of the properties, functions, and instrumentalities of
the federal government.25 M'Culloch v. Maryland brought these issues
to the Court with the controversy of Maryland's attempt to tax a fed-
eral bank upon issuance of bank notes.26 The tax was found to infringe
the federal Constitution because the laws of the United States are the
"supreme law of the land. ' 27 The bank had been created by an Act of
Congress "to carry into execution the powers vested in the general gov-
ernment. '28 The state's power to tax, the Court held, could not be used
in a way that would effectively repeal the act creating the bank.29
In the century following M'Culloch the doctrine of federal immunity
from state taxation was expanded to invalidate taxation that only indi-
rectly burdened federal entities. 30 For example, on the premise that an
income tax levied on the salary of a federal employee was a tax on the
means by which the United States exercised its powers, state income
taxation of federal workers was held unconstitutional in 1842.3 1 By the
early twentieth century this immunity had been extended to lessees of
government lands.32
Although this doctrine of federal immunity stood for over a hundred
years, a virtual reversal of its prohibitions was effected within a two-
year period at the close of the 1930's. 33 The economic adversities of the
Depression were, perhaps, the impetus for state and local governments
problems of evaluation, collection, enforcement, or liability in cases of default will not be in-
cluded. The most influential case on methods of valuation is DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San
Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955). See generally Smith, Taxing Possession of Federal
Property, 4 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 166 (1964).
25. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 361-66 (1819).
26. See id. at 319.
27. See id. at 360.
28. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 458 (1976) (citing M'Culloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427).
29. Id.
30. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 367-68
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG].
31. See Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
32. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (lessee of land owned
by state school exempted from federal income taxes); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922)
(lessees of Indian lands exempted from state income taxes).
33. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 367-68.
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to seek additional tax revenue to avert financial crises.34 A few cases
decided between 1937 and 1940 radically altered federal immunity
from state taxation.35
B. The Emergence of a Modern Doctrine
In 1937 the United States Supreme Court sustained a tax levied by
West Virginia on the gross sales and income of a contractor who was a
party to a construction contract with the United States. 36 Distinguish-
ing a private contractor from a government employee, the Court com-
pared the sales and income tax assessments to property tax liability on
property used to perform a contract.37 Then, in 1939, the nondiscrimi-
natory taxation of the income of federal employees was permitted by
the United States Supreme Court, holding that "a tax on income is
[not] legally or economically a tax on its source. ' 38 The Court noted
that this taxation did not burden the national government economically
and that federal employees should not be relieved "from contributing
their share of the financial support of the other [state] government,
whose benefits they enjoy . . . ,,31 This almost total reversal of the
federal immunity doctrine was completed by the Supreme Court's
overruling of cases that had extended tax immunity to lessees of federal
lands.40
Further inroads into the once complete immunity from taxation of
the federal government were premised upon what may be seen as an
early expression of the concept of possessory interest, and which ap-
peared in cases involving sales and use taxes levied against parties hav-
ing contractual relations with the United States.4 With a decision
based upon the distinction between the legal incidence of a tax and its
economic burden, the United States Supreme Court in 1941 decided
Alabama v. King & Boozer,4" which sustained a state sales tax on lum-
ber purchased by the contractor 43 for use in a cost-plus government
contract." The Court permitted the taxation even though title to the
34. See generally Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 30, at 367-68.
35. See generally Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 30, at 367-68.
36. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937).
37. See id. at 153.
38. See Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
39. Id. at 483 (citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 156-58).
40. See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). Helvering overruled
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1935) and Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922). 303 U.S. at 387. See note 32 supra.
41. See generaly Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) (state excise tax on stored gasoline
sold to United States held invalid); Panhandle Oil Co., v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (sales of
gasoline to United States for use in government vehicles held nontaxable).
42. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
43. See id. at 8.
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 312 (5th ed. 1979). A cost-plus contract is one that fixes the
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construction materials was taken by the United States upon their deliv-
ery to the contractor.45 Although permitting the imposition of state
taxes in cost-plus contractual arrangements ultimately increased the
costs borne by the federal government, the taxation was upheld as not
laid directly on the federal government. The Court specified that "the
existence or nonexistence of an economic burden upon the Govern-
ment can no longer be accepted as the touchstone of validity or invalid-
ity of a tax imposed upon a private person.
46
Such dilution of the federal immunity doctrine was not seen immedi-
ately in the area of property taxation. In the 1944 case of United States
v. County of Allegheny, 47 for example, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed that ad valorem48 taxes could not be imposed on the
property of the federal government.4 9 But in 1958 the Court decided
three cases that radically affected the immunity that had been protected
in Allegheny and that ultimately culminated in a determination up-
holding the constitutionality of taxation schemes that assessed business
users of property as if they were property owners.
C Crystallization of the Modern Doctrine
At issue in United States v. City of Detroit5" and United States v.
Township of Muskegon51 were Michigan statutes permitting tax assess-
ment and collection in the same manner for government lessees or
users of tax-exempt property as for owners.5 2 In these cases corpora-
tions had leased federally owned commercial production plants53 or
had been permitted to use government facilities to fulfill Army con-
tracts. 4 The Court sustained the statutes, reasoning that the tax did
not violate any federal immunity because the assessment was on the
amount to be paid the contractor on a general basis of the cost of the material and labor, plus an
agreed percentage thereof as profits. Such contracts are used when costs of production or con-
struction are unknown or difficult to ascertain in advance.
45. 314 U.S. at 10.
46. Id. at 5. The justices noted that Congress had also declined to pass legislation immuniz-
ing cost-plus contractors from state taxation, see id. at 8. But see Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,
347 U.S. 110 (1954) in which the Court invalidated state sales taxes on construction equipment
under a cost-plus federal contract which specified that the construction company procure the
equipment as an agent for the United States.
47. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
48. Literally, "according to the value." An ad valorem tax is imposed on the value of prop-
erty and levied in proportion to its value, as determined by assessment or appraisal. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979).
49. 322 U.S. at 189.
50. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
,51. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
52. MICH. STAT. ANN. §7.7(5), (6). (Supp. 1957). Normal procedure for tax-exempt property
is severance and assessment of the value of the interest or use. Taxation of non-exempt property is
based upon total proprty value.
53. 355 U.S. at 468.
54. See 355 U.S. at 485.
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privilege of use and not upon the property itself." The Court permit-
ted assessment on the full value of the property;5 6 Michigan therefore
realized indirectly the amount of revenue that would have been pro-
duced by an invalid direct tax upon government property. 7 These
cases marked the first time the United States Supreme Court had up-
held a tax against the federal government that so closely resembled a
property tax. In noting that this tax was assessed only against users of
property owned by tax-exempt entities, the Court indicated an aware-
ness of the inequities of private users or occupants escaping taxation
through the fortuitous circumstance of leasing property from a tax-ex-
empt owner. 8
The Court fully repudiated the Allegheny prohibition against a prop-
erty tax on the government in City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation.
There the Court upheld state taxation of airplane materials and work-
in-progress in the possession of the Murray Corporation, a government
subcontractor, although title to this property vested in the United States
upon the acceptance of partial payment by the corporation.6" The rele-
vant Michigan statute categorized the tax as a property tax on the full
value of the property, to be assessed against either the owner or the
person in possession.6' The Court sustained the statute by reasoning
that its practical effect was identical to the use taxes found to be consti-
tutional in United States v. City of Detroit and United States v. Townsho
of Muskegon.
With this line of cases, the distinction had crystallized that a tax
upon the use of property is not a tax upon the property itself and that a
finding of constitutionality depends upon distinguishing the direct inci-
dent of a tax from its economic burden. Thus, constitutionality today
depends upon whether the direct incidence of a tax falls upon the fed-
eral government or upon the party possessing the tax-exempt property
or enjoying its use.6" Before such constitutional questions are ad-
dressed, however, a finding of possessory interest is required. The in-
terrelationship between federal immunity and the requisite possessory
interest is illustrated by the interests of federal employees in govern-
55. See 355 U.S. at 486, 355 U.S. at 469-70.
56. See 355 U.S. at 485, 355 U.S. at 467-68.
57. See 355 U.S. at 486, 355 U.S. at 473.
58. See geheraly Note, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 157 (1958) (dis-
cussing United States v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United States v. Township of Mus-
kegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958)).
59. 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
60. Id. at 491.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. See generally Note, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 157 (1958). The
case law has not, of course, abolished such constitutional requirements as procedural and substan-
tive due process, equal protection, public purpose, appropriate governmental immunity, etc.
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ment living quarters in California. An examination of the development
of the taxation of possessory interests as a state revenue policy is neces-
sary to lend perspective to this interrelationship.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSSESSORY INTEREST
TAXATION IN CALIFORNIA
The basic authority of California to tax is inherent in its sover-
eignty.63 The state retains the power of taxation of all property, with
only such limitations as those expressed in its own64 and in the United
States Constitution.6 5 These exemptions except exports, imports, 66 and
tonnages, 67 as well as'property held by the United States when the
rights of the federal government might be impaired if its property were
taxed by the constituent states.68
The state constitution mandates that taxation of property is the
rule.69 Any exemptions are the exception to that rule, a concept codi-
fied in Sections 201 and 202 of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code.7 °
With half of its lands in the public domain, California must obtain
revenue from sources other than property tax. The tax burden has
gradually shifted in the last 70 years from revenue derived from prop-
erty tax to revenue derived from other sources.7I Recognition of the
need to tax property interests other than the fee interest arose during
the gold rush days. 72 In the 1850's miners extracted gold worth mil-
lions of dollars from lands in the public domain without incurring tax
63. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 351-52, 370 (1819).
64. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §1. Although the California Constitution purports to "ex-
empt" federal property from state taxation, the true source of immunity is generally regarded as
stemming from the United States Constitution, as interpreted in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See note 65 and accompanying text infra. A more accurate term for such
reservation of power regarding federally owned lands and improvements is "tax-immune" prop-
erty, rather than "tax-exempt." But since statutes and all major sources in the literature use "tax-
exempt," that characterization will be used throughout this comment.
65. The United States Constitution limits the taxing power of the states in a number of provi-
sions: U.S. CONsT. art. VI (Supremacy Clause); art. I, §8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); §10, cl. 2
(limitations on taxation of imports and exports); and the fourteenth amendment (due process and
equal protection clauses).
66. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §10.
67. See id. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (5th ed. 1979). Tonnage is the capacity of a
vessel for carrying freight and other loads, calculated in tons, which is the basis for imposition of
taxes and duties.
68. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 367-70.
69. Article thirteen, Section one of the California Constitution establishes that "all property
in the State, except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value. ... California Revenue and Taxation
Code Section 202 also specifically exempts from taxation property that is exempt under the laws of
the United States.
70. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§201, 202.
71. See EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, §1.3 at 6, 7 (2d ed. 1979).
72. See EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, §50 at 60 (1967).
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liability.73 These interests ultimately were designated as taxable by the
state Supreme Court in 1859.14 In 1866 the court expanded the concept
of taxable possessory interests in tax-exempt property by upholding
possessory interest taxation on improvements placed upon federally
owned lands by an adverse possessor.75 The 1872 enactment of the
Field Codes advanced the distinction of possession or right to posses-
sion from ownership, in lands and improvements.76 In 1895, taxation
of possessory interests in tax-exempt lands was specifically codified 77
and statutes enacted in 1921 permitted taxation of improvements on
tax-exempt land.78 Legislative recognition that possession is "a valua-
ble species of property subsisting in the hands of the citizens" was
thereby complete.79
The California case law and its relationship to federal constitutional
issues that have developed since M'Culloch have established the foun-
dation of the theory of possessory interest taxation without infringing
intergovernmental immunities. California case law and state legisla-
tion support the concepts of multiple interests in property and of taxa-
tion of valuable possessory interests that may be imposed
constitutionally although the land itself may not be taxed. Still un-
resolved, however, is the exact level of possessory interest required
before taxation can be validly imposed on tenants of tax-exempt own-
ers-such as military personnel. This problem continues to surface in
recent cases.
A. Judicial Interpretation Prior to Fresno
Possessory interest issues have been litigated consistently over the
years," resulting in the clarification of some ateas while others remain
unsettled. Reaching a workable definition of what constitutes a posses-
sory interest is a recurring problem.8 '
73. See id.
74. See State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56, 69-72 (1859).
75. See People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 655-58 (1866).




79. See 30 Cal. at 656.
80. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 3d 325, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 261 (1976); Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp. v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 715 (1976); General Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794
(1958); San Pedro, L.A., & S.L.R.R. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18 (1919); L.E. White Lum-
ber Co. v. Mendocino, 177 Cal. 710, 171 P. 799 (1919); Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 235, 285 P. 896 (1930).
81. The State Board has updated Assessors' Handbook AH 517 and greatly expanded its list
of typical possessory interests. The new list is as follows:
1. Forest Service permits, residential and commercial, including ski lifts, resorts,
stores, and cabins.
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To find a taxable possessory interest in the lessee of federally owned
shipyards in Kaiser v. Reid, 2 the California Supreme Court enumer-
ated the requirements for finding a possessory interest as the conferral,
by agreement, of exclusive use and possession for a fixed period.
8 3
These elements were then found to generate a private benefit to the
lessee.8 4 The Kaiser definition lent stability to the determination of
what constituted possessory interest for about 35 years. Although Mr.
Kaiser's benefit was the right to conduct his business at a profit, in Rand
Corporation v. County ofLos Angeles"5 an appellate court found a taxa-
ble interest even in federally owned improvements leased by a non-
profit corporation. 6 The court felt that this interest was property and
the holder of such an interest should contribute a fair share of taxes to
the state government.8 7 In the 1968 case of Mattson v. County of Contra
Costa,8 8 the operator of a clubhouse on a municipal golf course was
found to have a taxable possessory interest.8 9 Here the court enumer-
ated the factors that gave rise to a possessory interest as those stemming
from the agreement between the government and the lessee. 90 Specifi-
cally, the factors were "relative durability, -independence, exclusiveness
and fixedness, and others of relative impermanence, subject to control
and public participation." 9' The court added that what constituted a
possessory interest for taxation purposes depended upon an examina-
tion of the entire agreement between the government and the private
party.92
2. Harbor leases, residential, commercial, and industrial.
3. Downtown auto parking leases.
4. Possession and use of residences owned by public agencies.
5. Employee housing on tax-exempt land.
6. Airport permits, including parking and garage leases.
7. Grazing land permits.
8. Indian land leases.
9. The right to cut and remove standing timber on public lands.
10. Gas, petroleum, or other hydrocarbon rights in public lands.
11. Unpatented mining claims.
12. The possession of public property at harbors, factories, airports, golf courses, mari-
nas, recreation areas, parks, stadiums, and government facilities.
13. Possession and use of government-ownedflxed equipment.
14. Air rights over public lands or freeways.
See EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 12, §50 at 61, 62 (1967) (Supp. 1976).
82. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947).
83. See id. at 618, 184 P.2d at 884. See generally Possessory Interest Tax, supra note 10 at
827.
84. See 30 Cal. 2d at 619, 184 P.2d at 885.
85. 241 Cal. App. 2d 585, 50 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1966).
86. Id. at 590-91, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
87. Id. at 592, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 703. See generally Possessory Interest Tax, supra note 10 at
835.
88. 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968).
89. Id. at 212, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
90. Id. at 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
91. Id.
92. See id. See generally Possessory Interest Tax, supra note 10, at 836.
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The lack of a definitive delineation of the elements necessary to sup-
port a finding of a possessory interest has contributed to the present
unsettled situation in this area of assessment and taxation. A crucial
area in terms of potential revenue and numbers of affected taxpayers is
the interest of federal employees in living quarters provided by the
United States on or near federal installations where these employees
live and work. With half of California in the public domain and with
the proliferation of military and government installations with large
populations, lack of assessments of these potential taxpayers has re-
sulted in the loss of a significant amount of revenue to the state treasury
and a disproportionate shifting of the tax burden to non-exempt tax-
payers.
Taxation of the possessory interests of federal employees in their liv-
ing quarters at first appeared to be an uncontroversial source of reve-
nue. In McCaslin v. DeCamp,93 decided in 1967, a California appellate
court held that employees of the Central California Irrigation District
were subject to taxation for their occupancy of housing provided by
this tax-exempt public agency.94 Although workers paid monthly
rental fees and their month-to-month tenancies were revocable at any
time, the court concluded that the rentals rose to the level of a taxable
property right.95
In the same year, Fresno and Tuolonne Counties assessed a prop-
erty tax against forest rangers residing in housing provided to them by
the federal government in three national forests in those counties.96 Al-
though the rangers claimed to be mere agents of the government, and
therefore without a taxable interest, the assessments were sustained on
appeal and the decision affirmed in 1977 by th United States Supreme
Court in United States v. County of Fresno . 7 The developing consis-
tency of these cases, however, was soon disturbed. Presumably in reli-
ance on Fresno, assessors in Yuba and Humboldt Counties sought to
tax U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy personnel residing in base quarters. 98
On appeal from the district court's summary judgment for the United
States, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
clared the tax on military personnel unconstitutional on September 24,
93. 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967).
94. See id. at 17-18, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46.
95. See id.
96. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1975).
97. See 429 U.S. 452,453 (1977) which was heard together with the unreported case of United
States v. County ofTuolumne, also on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Califoria, Fifth Appel-
late District.
98. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 445 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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1980 in United States v. County of Humboldt, Calffornia.99
With no appeals presently pending from the Ninth Circuit decision,
the immediate resolution of these conflicting opinions will be unaided
by Supreme Court consideration. Analysis of the future development
of these issues, the consequences for thousands of individual taxpayers,
and the impact on the state revenue base require closer examination of
the two major decisions. An overview of Fresno and Humboldt will be
followed by an analysis of the constitutionality of possessory interest
taxation of occupants of quarters located on tax-exempt lands.
B. United States v. County of Fresno 10
In the wake of McCaslin, tax officials in Fresno and Tuolumne
Counties levied annual possessory use assessments against rangers em-
ployed by the United States Forest Service. 10' The rangers lived with
their families in housing built and owned by the Forest Service in the
Sierra and Sequoia National Forests. 102 Occupancy was required in
the provided residences so that rangers might be nearer their duties and
presumably be better able to perform them, although some rangers
lived in privately owned quarters located outside the forests.' 0 3 Bi-
monthly payroll deductions were made by the Forest Service for pro-
viding housing, since receiving shelter was regarded by both parties as
partial compensation for the rangers' services.' 4 The amounts de-
ducted were calculated by estimating the fair rental value of each unit
and then discounting the figure to reflect disadvantages incident to the
housing-the remote location, the distance from established communi-
ties, and the lack of such amenities as sidewalks, police and fire protec-
tion, or adequate telephone service.' 0 5
Constitutional concerns over the issues in Fresno were expressed at
the appellate level. 106 The appellate court determined that assessment
was not made against the government but rather was levied against
private citizens who were employed by the government.' 0 7 The possi-
bility of interference with government functions10 8 was disposed of by
99. See 628 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1980). This case included United States v. County of Yuba
consolidated by the court.
100. 429 U.S. 452 (1976).
101. See id. at 455-56.
102. See id. at 454.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 454-55.
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resort to Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission. 0 9 In that case the
United States Supreme Court indicated that state governments neces-
sarily must function in coordination with the federal government." 0
Within our dual system, state taxation
inevitably imposed some burdens on the national government of the
same kind as those imposed on the citizens of the United States
within the states' borders. . . those burdens, save as Congress may
act to remove them, are to be regarded as the normal incidents of the
operation within the same territory of a dual system of government,
and that no immunity of the national government from such burdens
is to be implied from the Constitution which established the sys-
tem. 111
On appeal in Fresno, the United States Supreme Court held that
California could constitutionally tax the forest rangers on their posses-
sory interests in housing owned and provided by their federal em-
ployer." 2 Beginning with a detailed examination of the M'Culloch
prohibition against direct state taxation of the federal government and
the historical modification of the immunity," 3 Justice White delivered
the majority opinion that taxes of possessory interests in exempt prop-
erty are permissible so long as they do not discriminate, are not laid
directly on the federal government, or are not forbidden by Con-
gress." 14 The use taxes sustained in the 1958 Detroit cases were cited as
dispositive of the issue that the legal incidence of this possessory inter-
est tax fell neither on the federal government nor on federal property,
but rather on private persons employed by the government."15
C. United States v. County of Humboldt" l6
With the seemingly sufficient authority for possessory interest taxa-
tion of occupants of government quarters, established by Fresno, tax
officials in Yuba and Humboldt Counties notified local military com-
manders of their intentions to commence assessment of possessory in-
terests in military housing for the fiscal year 1977.117 Assessments were
levied upon occupants of quarters at Beale Air Force Base in Yuba
County and residents of government housing near the naval station in
Humboldt County." 8 The United States sought injunctive and declar-
109. 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
110. See id. at 270-71.
111. Id. at 271. See also Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939).
112. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 (1977).
113. See 1d. at 457-64.
114. See id. at 464-68.
115. See id. at 464-67.
116. 628 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1980).
117. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 445 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
118. See id. at 854.
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atory relief in federal district court, raising constitutional grounds in
briefs and arguments. The district court, however, declined to reach
the merits of these contentions, deciding instead on the invalidity of the
tax and finding it unauthorized by California law, holding that military
occupancy did not meet the Section 107 definition of possessory inter-
est. Citing Fresno, the court distinguished military housing on the
characteristic of private and independent benefit to the occupant, a
characterization upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 119 Stat-
ing that the interests of service personnel in housing provided to them
"is neither private nor durable," the Ninth Circuit panel summarily
concluded that such housing could not be of private benefit because the
Internal Revenue Service excludes it from gross income. 120 Lacking
the threshold finding of a possessory interest, the district court in Hum-
boldt did not reach interpretation of constitutional issues.' 2' One
Ninth Circuit judge concluded that possessory interest requirements
were satisfied, but joined the other two judges in their opinion that
even with a finding of a valid possessory interest, the tax could not
escape constitutional prohibition. 2 In the view of the Ninth Circuit
panel, such a tax would impermissibly burden a federal function be-
cause it might create military recruitment disincentives and morale
problems generated by disparate state administration of possessory in-
terest taxation.' 23
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAXATION OF OCCUPANCY
OF MILITARY QUARTERS
A determination of the constitutionality of taxation of occupancy of
military quarters requires examination of two major issues. A finding
of possessory interest is essential or the tax would fail even if otherwise
constitutional. Second, the tax cannot impair or impede a function of
the federal government.
A. Is the Occupancy of Military Quarters a Possessory Interest?
The historical difficulty of defining possessory interest continues, as
seen in Fresno and Humboldt. The consensus of the decisions concern-
ing private users of tax-exempt property, 2 4 however, is that something
119. Seeid. at 856-57; 628 F.2d at 551.
120. 628 F.2d at 551. See TREAs. REG. §1.162-2(b) (1954).
121. See 445 F. Supp. at 856.
122. See 628 F.2d at 552-53.
123. See id. at 553.
124. See, e.g., Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal. 2d 610,184 P.2d 879 (1947); Pacific Grove-Asilomar
Operatin orp. v. County of Monterey, 43 Cal. App. 3d 675, 117 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1974); Sea-LandServic, Cnc. v. County of Alameda, 36 Cal. App. 3d 83 , 1 2 Cal. tr. 113 ( ); Board of
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more is required than merely meeting the statutory definition (use or
possession unaccompanied by ownership). That "something more"
generally is stated as a requirement that some private, beneficial use
accrue to the users for their interest to rise to taxable levels.' 25 To
demonstrate the existence of such possessory interest by military per-
sonnel, the facts of Humboldt will be compared to those of Fresno.
Although the Fresno appellate court noted that the right to use feder-
ally owned land or improvements has developed into an interest sub-
ject to state taxation, the court, in its consideration of the taxation of
the forest rangers, also emphasized that not all private use of tax-ex-
empt land and improvements is taxable.' 26 The use must rise to the
level of possessory interest, and to do so, the interest must be more than
"naked possession." '127 The Fresno appellate court found that "some-
thing more" arose from a degree of exclusivity enjoyed by the occu-
pants so that their use was more than a "right in common with others,
or something more than serving only the needs of the employer."'
128
The user or occupant essentially must enjoy "something more than the
means of performing their employer's purpose, so that it can be said,
realistically, that the occupancy or use substantially serves an in-
dependent, private interest."' 29 This reasoning was used by the Ninth
Circuit in Humboldt as a means of strengthening its finding that there
was no possessory interest in occupancy by military tenants. 30 To sup-
port this finding, the three-judge panel pointed out that even with the
expanding nature of possessory interests, "four elements have always
been required: whether a particular interest is a taxable possessory one
is a question for case-by-case resolution; the principal factors are exclu-
siveness, independence, durability, and private benefit."'' While it is
true that these factors originated in Mattson v. County of Contra
Costa132 and were articulated in Dressler v. County of Alpine 13 3 in 1976,
their glibness as a test for possessory interest belies their usefulness as a
workable analysis. The factors have proved to be more form than sub-
stance and their value as a dispositive test has never been borne out by
Supervisors of County of Modoc v. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1971); Mattson
v. County of Contra Costa, 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968); McCaslin v. DeCamp,
248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal. App. 2d 311,
134 P.2d 15 (1943).
125. See note 124 supra.
126. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 639, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 550-
51(1975).
127. See id. at 550-52, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1980).
131. Dressier v. County of Alpine, 64 Cal. App. 3d 557, 564, 134 Cal. Rptr. 554, 558 (1976).
132. Mattson v. County of Contra Costa, 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968).
133. See 64 Cal. App. 3d at 564, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
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the cases. Beyond recitation of the terms over the years since Mattson,
the opinions have not evolved the factors into a workable test. This is a
weakness inherent in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit; the terms are
merely mentioned, neither defined nor applied to the facts, and used to
support a cursory conclusion. A more detailed analysis of these factors
will illuminate additional significant characteristics.
L Relative Durability
Two of the three Ninth Circuit judges labelled military housing
"neither private nor durable," relying on its exclusion from gross in-
come and the lack of rental payments.134 Two aspects of the durability
factor must be considered; it is helpful to compare the interests of the
forest rangers considered in Fresno with the concerns of the Ninth Cir-
cuit judges in Humboldt.
The two aspects of the durability factor that merit consideration are,
first, termination of employment, and, second, transfer of duty stations
occurring during the course of employment. Regarding the first aspect,
either the forest rangers in Fresno or their government employer could
terminate employment; the rangers could quit or the employer could
fire them.' 35  Such voluntary or involuntary termination of employ-
ment is not duplicated for the service person. On the other hand, mili-
tary employment is not an ironclad contract. Termination of military
employment can occur by expiration of the service agreement, 3 6 resig-
nation by the individual, 37 or termination initiated by the military for
the convenience of the government. 138 The length of the termination
process depends upon whether it is voluntary, involuntary, or con-
nected with disciplinary proceedings. 3  These aspects would tend to
give stability to military employment rather than add to the imperma-
nent quality of military life mentioned by the Ninth Circuit court.
The Ninth Circuit court claimed that frequent transfer of military
134. See 628 F.2d at 551.
135. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551
(1975). This argument effectively defeated the rangers' contentions that they were merely agents
of the government and thus without possessory interests.
136. See generally AIR FORCE REGULATION 39-10 Separation Uon Expiration of Term of
Servicefor Convenience of the Government, Minority, Dependency, and Hardshi (1977).
137. See generally AIR FORCE REGULATION 36-94 Specfled Period of Time Contract (1980);
AIR FORCE REGULATION 36-51 Active Duty Service Commitments (1975).
138. See generally Administrative Discharge Procedures (Unfitness), Unacceptable Conduct, or
In The Interest ofNational Security, AIR FORCE REGULATION 36-2, (1976); Administrative Dis-
charge Procedures (1976) (Substandard Performance of Duty) AIR FORCE REGULATION 36-3; Ad-
ministrative Separation ofCommissioned Officers and Warrant Officers ofthe Air Force, AIR FORCE
REGULATION 36-12 (1977); Separation for Unsuitability, Unfitness, or Misconduct; Resignation or
Request for Dischargefor the Good of the Service, and Proceduresfor Rehabilitation Program, AIR
FORCE MANUAL 39-12 (1966).
139. See note 138 supra.
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families results in the absence of durability in housing to such an extent
that the tenancies of these families must be characterized, in effect, as
tenancies at sufferance.' 40 Transfers between duty stations during the
course of military service is a second aspect bearing on permanence of
quarters. 'The Fresno appellate court specifically noted that the fact
that leases of the forest rangers were terminable at the will of the lessor-
employer did not automatically render the rangers without possessory
interest. 14 1 The mere possibility of revocation of the tenancy did not
automatically render it valueless.' 42
Military life is indeed somewhat nomadic. Change of duty station is
inevitable, with or without promotion, as it is for many federal employ-
ees. While transfer was predominantly theoretical for the forest rang-
ers, 143 it is more than reality for the military employee. Even so, the
reality of transfer in the modem military is not as disruptive or as fre-
quent as the Ninth Circuit judges fear. Lengths of duty tours have sta-
bilized under fiscal programs as well as under policies to reduce career
irritants to military personnel.'" Certain assignments carry mandatory
36- to 48-month stability requirements, 145 a length of time that can give
substantial durability to occupancy of living quarters. In addition, lo-
cal practice is to assign family quarters for the duration of the time the
military member is assigned to the installation. 46 Since the federal
employer bears the cost of shipment of household goods for families
occupying military quarters, occupancy of quarters and termination of
rentals normally accompany only the permanent reassignment of the
individual.' 47 Furthermore, the characteristic of mobility is not a fac-
tor unique to military life. Many corporate employees and their fami-
lies are relocated frequently as conditions of their employment
demand. Mobility and durability also are not considerations regarding
140. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1980).
141. See 50 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
142. The possibility of revocation is a factor to be considered, however, in fixing the value of
the possessory interest. See id. See generally Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 36
Cal. App. 3d 837, 112 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974); Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d 717,
96 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1971); McCaslin v. DeCamp, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967).
143. See 50 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 552. It was estimated that the average
Forest Service employee in Tuolumne County remained in Forest Service quarters for a period of
five years. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 456 (1977).-
144. See generally United States Air Force Reenlistment and Retention Program, AIR FORCE
REGULATION 35-16 (1979); Airman Assignments, AIR FORCE REGULATION 39-11. "Career irri-
tant" is a military colloquialism referring to the less desirable aspects of life in the armed forces.
Certain situations can become so annoying to military personnel that they resign from the service
because of them. The most commonly mentioned are relocation, job transfers, frequent business
travel, and lack of choice in job assignments and training programs.
145. See note 144 supra.
146. See generally Housing: Assignment ofFamiy Housing, Chs. 6, 10, AIR FORCE REGULA-
TION 90-1 (1977).
147. See generally Members of the Uniformed Services, Chs. 4 and 8, JOINT TRAVEL REGULA-
TIONS (1977).
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property taxes or rental costs that presumably reflect taxes paid by non-
exempt owners.
2. Independence and Exclusiveness
The requirement of independence, called "privacy" by the Ninth
Circuit,148 overlaps the factor of exclusiveness because of the develop-
ment in the basic case law that the existence of possessory interest re-
quires living arrangements to be exclusive enough to confer a private
benefit to the user. 49 In Fresno, the Forest Service reserved the right to
use the homes rented to the rangers in emergency situations-e.g., sta-
tioning additional personnel in quarters during forest fires or other nat-
ural disasters. 5 ' In a characterization important to the outcome of the
case, the court termed such reservation of rights merely incidental to
the rental arrangements.' 5' These incidental reserved rights thus did
not disturb the residential character of the living quarters. In contrast,
military housing is not subject to such emergency requirements, mainly
because of their residential nature and the availability of other equip-
ment and facilities to deal with contingencies.
The military occupant, like any occupant of rented quarters, does not
have total control over the dwelling. The basic relationship between
the military member and the employer in this aspect of the employ-
ment arrangement is that of lessee-lessor. The government-lessor thus
retains master keys and reserves the right to give notice and perform
periodic inspections of the premises. 152 Such reservation of rights does
not destroy the predominant residential character of the quarters and is
within standard rental practice and established landlord-tenant law.'53
Military occupants suffer no excessive intrusion nor any disturbance
more onerous than their military colleagues residing in privately owned
rental units. Reasonable entry by landlords for legitimate purposes is
an incident of leased quarters in general and not a feature unique to
military occupancy which might negate its exclusivity.' 5 4
The cases establish not only that possession must be exclusive to sup-
port possessory interest taxation, but that the interest is taxable to the
148. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1980).
149. See note 124 supra.
150. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 635-36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548,
550 (1978). But the record showed that this rarely happened.
151. See id.
152. See generally Housing: Assignment of Family Housing, Ch. 13 AIR FORCE REGULATION
90-1 (1977).
153. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Properly §5 (8th ed.
1973).
154. See note 153 supra.
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person in possession. 155 Fresno is in accord with these decisions and
should be valid stare decisis for the Humboldt court to have reached a
similar conclusion.
3. Private Benefit
The factor dispositive of a finding of possessory interest is private
benefit.' 56 The user or occupant essentially must enjoy a substantial
independent and private interest.' 57 The characteristics of indepen-
dence, exclusivity, and durability reinforce private benefit.
An important indication of private benefit is simply that service per-
sonnel occupying federal quarters thereby are relieved from finding
and maintaining housing elsewhere. Despite its simplicity, the true
value of this asset must not be overlooked. As Justice White wrote in
Fresno:
Since virtually everyone in this country pays for housing for himself
or herself and family, common sense compels the conclusion that the
occupancy of a house provided by an employer for an employee's
family is of personal financial benefit to the employee-relieving him
of the expense of paying for housing elsewhere.15
This concept of benefit was supported unanimously by the United
States Supreme Court in Fresno; one judge on the Humboldt panel also
was persuaded by its logic. 59 Further indications of the value of the
quarters provided are gained by an examination of the character of
housing on military installations.
Large military installations such as Beale Air Force Base, located in
Yuba County in northeastern California, are best described as resem-
bling small towns. Literature available from official base organizations
describes the Beale housing area as "nestled among the foothills of the
Sierra Nevada"' 6 ° and indicates that these quarters are '"approximately
10 miles from the flight line and the noise associated with flying opera-
tions." ' 6 ' Beale Air Force Base provides housing for 1,737 families in
multi-plexes of two-, three-, and four-bedroom units, described as
"California ranch style, split level and duplex." 162 The housing units
are suburban homes with modem amenities-multiple bathrooms in
each unit, cable television, garages or carports. The housing areas are
155. See note 124 supra.
156. See note 124 supra.
157. See note 124 supra.
158. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 466 (1977).
159. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
160. See generally California Challenge-Your Assignment at Beale Air Force Base 20 (1979)
[copy on file at the PacKc Law Journal].
161. See id.162. See'id. at 10.
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landscaped and provided with streets, street lights, curbing, sidewalks,
etc. Residents enjoy fire and police protection and major and minor
repair services provided by the base civil engineers. In close proximity
to the housing areas are chapels, commissaries, convenience stores, so-
cial clubs, and recreational facilities that include golf courses, gymnasi-
ums, softball diamonds, and riding stables.'63 Beale Air Force Base,
like most modem military installations, is a self-contained community.
As part of the military enlistment agreement, the armed forces pro-
vide shelter to service personnel and their families.'64 The service
member receives in-kind quarters that vary according to the member's
rank and the needs of his or her family. If quarters are unavailable, a
monthly monetary award, called Basic Allowance for Quarters, is pro-
vided in lieu of in-kind housing. 65 The quarters allowance permits the
service person to make suitable private living arrangements in civilian
communities near the military installation.
What is the value of the housing that the military provides to its
personnel? Both the value of the quarters provided and the Basic Al-
lowance for Quarters stipend are exempted from gross income for fed-
eral income taxation purposes. 66 Gross income is defined traditionally
as "all income from whatever source derived."'' 67 Modernly the term
has come to mean any item that increases the taxpayer's net worth.' 68
Receipt of housing increases net worth because the taxpayer who is
provided shelter is relieved of obtaining it elsewhere, a substantial ben-
efit even without determining its exact value. 69
The Ninth Circuit's concern with the duration of residency in mili-
tary quarters170 does not negate the private benefit of this housing.
Once quarters are occupied on a permanent basis by a military member
who moves into them with his or her family and all household effects,
the quality of the shelter ceases to be that of transitory lodging. Once
that transitory status has been exceeded, the duration of the occupancy
cannot be dispositive of finding of private benefit. Very brief occu-
pancy may generate administrative problems in assessing and collect-
ing the tax, but duration of residency alone is not a valid basis for
163. See id. at 31-33.
164. Military housing is provided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1501-1594 (1976).
165. Basic allowance for Quarters is authorized by Exec. Order No. 11,157, 3 C.F.R. 119
(1973), reprinted in 37 U.S.C. §402 (1976). See Joint Uniform Military Pay System, AIR FORCE
MANUAL 177-373 (1979). Rates in effect for family housing allowances as of October 1, 1980
range from $234.30 per month to $535.20 per month.
166. See TREAS. REG. §1.162-2(b) (1954).
167. See I.R.C. §61.
168. See generally 84 C.J.S. Taxation §1096(a) (1954).
169. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460 (1977).
170. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
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finding private benefit of little value. Other taxation procedures-for
real property or income tax, for example-are not based upon duration
of residency or duration of employment in the state. Brevity alone
should not excuse tax liability. The benefit conferred must control tax
liability. Once duration of possession is reasonable enough to support
private benefit, taxation is appropriate because the possessory interest
requisite to a finding of constitutionality has been established. This
discussion of the factors of durability, independence, and exclusivity
has established that the military tenant in government quarters enjoys
sufficient private benefit to support a finding of possessory interest.
This threshold requirement of possessory interest must precede a deter-
uination of the constitutionality of the taxation of that interest.
B. Constitutionality of Possessory Interest Taxation
1. The Indirect Burden
As cases since M'Culloch have established, a valid tax must be upon
the individual and not upon the government.' 7 ' The Fresno Court em-
phasized that the tax was constitutional when levied upon the use of the
quarters; this use was held to be by the occupant, and not by the gov-
ernment. 1
72
The district court in Humboldt did not reach the constitutional issues
since it found that military occupancy of government quarters did not
rise to the level of a taxable possessory interest. The district court ad-
vanced the opinion, however, that even with the finding of a valid pos-
sessory interest, the tax would be unconstitutional. 73 In agreement
with the district court, the Ninth Circuit panel concluded that such a
tax was unconstitutional in that it would burden a federal function with
resulting recruitment disincentives. 74 But, as the United States
Supreme Court has said, "it is very hard to tell what is meant by the
statement that a tax interferes with or burdens the Government's trans-
action." 175 The Supreme Court also pointed out in United States v. City
of Detroit that "all relevant circumstances" must be considered "to de-
termine if a tax is actually laid on the United States or its property"176
rather than on a private individual. Although the Ninth Circuit judges
pointed out possible inequitable assessments of possessory interest
taxes in a generalized discussion and speculated that morale of military
171. See notes 5-7 supra.
172. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 641, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1975).
173. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 445 F. Supp. 852, 856-57 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
174. See id. at 857.
175. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 3 (1941).
176. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958).
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members would decline were they subject to this taxation, 77 the rule
articulated in Fresno established that the "economic burden on a fed-
eral function of a state tax imposed on those who deal with the Federal
Government does not render the tax unconstitutional so long as the tax
is imposed equally on other similarly situated constituents of the
state." 17 8
2. The Speculative Effect on Recruitment and Morale
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Frontiero v. Richardson 79 to show
that free housing is an incentive to enlistment in the armed forces and
that if the tax were permitted the recruitment scheme would be ren-
dered so ineffective that an impediment to the national defense would
result. 180 With this reasoning the court espouses the curious position
that the removal of a benefit they characterized as valueless to the indi-
vidual would destroy incentives to enlist in order to receive it. Addi-
tionally, military housing is not technically free. Although no rental
payment is made each month, the military member occupies govern-
ment quarters only with the forfeiture of the Basic Allowance for
Quarters.18 ' And if the free housing is the recruiting incentive, it is this
feature and not the freedom from tax that is the enlistment inducement.
Furthermore, since almost half the states permit taxation of possessory
interest, a conclusion that assessments would disrupt recruitment
schemes is speculative at best. Finally, Frontiero simply does not sup-
port the proposition for which it is cited.'82
The potential impact of possessory interest taxation on military mo-
rale or conduct is also entirely speculative. No valid evidence exists to
support the contention that morale will decline, improve, or virtually
be unaffected. A conclusion of negative impact is unsupportable and
too speculative a basis for a finding of unconstitutionality.
3. Potential Discriminatory Impact of the Tax
To be constitutional, any tax is required to be levied alike "on all
persons similarly situated."' 83 Although otherwise valid, possessory in-
177. See United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
178. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460 (1977).
179. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
180. See 628 F.2d at 553.
181. See generally Housing: Assignment of Family Housing, Ch. 13, AIR FORCE REGULATION
90-1 (1977).
182. Frontiero addressed an equal protection issue in which husbands of military service
members were required to certify actual dependency and financial need before Basic Allowances
for Quarters could be authorized while wives of servicemen needed only to show marital status,
regardless of need or dependency. See 411 U.S. at 677.
183. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 519-22. See also Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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terest taxation of federal and military employees may be held unconsti-
tutional if found to be discriminatory in application or in effect. 184
The Fresno appellate court found the tax on the forest rangers to be
nondiscriminatory on the presumption that rangers living outside the
forests contributed their share of the tax burden through the payment
of higher rentals to the private owners from whom they leased living
quarters.18 5 Such a rationale is applicable to the facts of Humboldt to
sustain taxation of service personnel living on base against allegations
of discriminatory assessments from military members residing off the
base.
In focusing on a different aspect of discriminatory application of pos-
sessory interest taxation, Justice Stevens, the only dissenter in Fresno,
pointed out that occupants of some quarters or improvements owned
and maintained by tax-exempt owners presently are not subject to state
taxation as are the forest rangers. 8 6 Referring'particularly to owners
such as universities, hospitals, and churches, Justice Stevens noted in
his opinion that the present lack of taxation of persons enjoying the
possession or use of these government-owned lands or improvements is
inequitable when compared to other government employees, arguably
similarly situated, who presently are being taxed.'8 7
CONCLUSION
The issue of state taxation of federal lands or improvements has been
a controversial one since M'Culloch v. Maryland. It remains so today.
The genesis of the issue lies in the concepts of federalism and basic
intergovernmental immunities, concerns that underlie the controversy
over state taxation of the possessory interests of private parties using or
possessing land or property owned by a tax-exempt entity. Just as De-
184. An argument might be raised that taxation of military personnel is prevented by 50
U.S.C. App. §574(1) (1981) commonly known as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. Ex-
amination of the legislative purpose indicates that the act is intended to prevent double taxation of
military members by their states of domicile as well as by the host state in which they are sta-
tioned. In 1969 the United States Supreme Court held that the act did not intend to free service
personnel from sales or use taxes of the host state and that prevention of double taxation did not
relieve military members from bearing their fair share of the costs of thp state government whose
benefits they enjoyed. Such a holding is consistent with the imposition ofpossessory interest taxes
on military members occupying government housing in California. See Sullivan v. United States,
395 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1969). See generally Bagley, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief ,4ct-4 Sur-
vey, 45 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1969); Murchison, The Impact of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
on State Taxation of Mobile Homes, 19 A. F. JAG L. REv. 235 (1977).
185. The general federal governmental policy that use of community resources should not go
uncompensated is reflected in 20 U.S.C. §236 (1976) which provides that California receive federal
funds for educating children residing on federal property, even though such payments are sub-
stantially less than the tax yield from such property.
186. See United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553
(1975).
187. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 469-71 (1977).
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pression economic conditions contributed to the development of major
limitations of governmental immunities, present adverse economic con-
ditions are shaping the modem development of federal immunity from
state taxation.
This comment has discussed the taxation of possessory interests of
forest rangers in living quarters leased from their federal employer, tax-
ation imposed by California and upheld as constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court. 88 By showing that military personnel occupy-
ing government quarters on military installations in northern Califor-
nia enjoy a possessory interest virtually analogous to that of the forest
rangers, this comment has demonstrated that the interest enjoyed by
the military personnel confers a private benefit upon them. 89 Service
members residing in base quarters owned, provided, and maintained
by their military employer enjoy as much privacy, independence, and
durability in these living arrangements as any private lessee. These in-
terests therefore rise to the level of possessory interests, fall within the
meaning of Section 107 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code,
and may be validly taxed by the state.
The imposition of possessory interest taxes on military personnel
would not violate federal immunities. This comment has shown that
this would be levied upon the use of improvements on federal lands
and not upon the property itself or upon the federal government. 190
Furthermore, the constitutional validity of the tax depends not upon
the nature of the federal instrumentality owning the property, but upon
the effect of the tax. State taxation of military possessory interests can
be imposed without impairing or impeding the federal function of na-
tional defense. The fears of the Ninth Circuit of declining enlistments,
reduced retention rates, and plummeting morale led to its conclusion in
Humboldt that taxation would impermissibly burden a federal func-
tion. No evidence supports such speculation. Moreover, the court's
premise for this conclusion was that military housing is free, a proposi-
tion that has been shown to be factually erroneous.' 91 This comment
has demonstrated that military personnel residing in government hous-
ing enjoy possessory interests in those quarters. A taxation scheme can
thus be validly imposed upon these possessory interests without imped-
ing federal functions or violating the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution-two concerns that remain as important to inter-
188. See notes 100-115 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 116-123 and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 156-65, 171-78 and accompanying text supra.
191. See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
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governmental relations today as they were in M'Culloch v. Maryland
over one hundred and sixty years ago.
Sharon D. Stuart
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